Individualism in English farming; "up Horn, down Corn"; effect of the nation's commercial policy; the War 1914-18; destruction of shipping; the Milner Committee (1915); transport and food difficulties, 1917-18; necessity for increased production at home; unfavourable prospects, Dec. 1916; position compared with that of Napoleonic Wars; Government control of the industry; its aims and organisation; Corn Production Act, 1917; results of food campaign; lessons of State control.
IN some foreign countries, notably in Germany and Denmark, the whole farming industry has made great and simultaneous advances within short periods of time. It has had behind it the directing force of a definite policy. During the last seventy years in England, farming has progressed on different lines. Its history is mainly that of thousands of separate enterprises, conducted as private businesses. In the slowness of its general advance, and in the variations of its standard from good to bad, it bears the stamp of individualism. Each man farms his holding according to his skill, character, tastes and capital. "The best farming is that which pays the farmer best." The idea that the nation is, or could be, vitally concerned in the use to which the land is put, or in the kind and quantity of food that it produces, seldom occurred to landowners or tenants, or, except as a political theory, to any large section of the general community. Farmers grew the produce which, from time to time, promised to yield the most certain return on their invested capital. Without State direction, or accepted leadership, the line of individual progress is the only one which they can pursue. Its main tendency has been dictated by the commercial policy of the nation. England transferred her corn-growing to distant lands, where grain can be grown more cheaply than at home. Compelled by the density of her population to buy a portion of her food abroad, she could only pay for it with the produce of her factories. The policy may have been carried too far. But its precise form was dictated by the mutual advantage of ourselves and our customers. Wheat makes a good cargo; it is also a convenient commodity for the younger foreign nations to exchange against our manufactured merchandise. Live cattle, on the contrary, are bad travellers on ship-board, and dead meat can only be carried in chilled or frozen form. As England grew wealthy from its commerce, it became a meat-eating nation. It was ready to pay good prices for fresh beef and mutton of the best quality. Farmers as men of business followed the national lead. They obeyed the laws of demand and supply. They revised their methods. A manufacturing nation prayed "God speed the plough on every soil but our own." Farmers responded with the cry "Down Corn, up Horn," which saved them from financial ruin. Live-stock and their products became the predominant branch of the industry. The problem of feeding the nation was taken out of farmers' hands. It was solved by the commercial policy of exchanging exports of home manufactures against imports of foreign corn and meat. Farmers, therefore, chose the safest, cheapest, and least anxious method of feeding their flocks and herds. They utilised the nation's trading system to purchase foreign food-stuffs for their stock, and, secure of winter keep, dispensed as far as possible with the plough. Cornland was laid down to grass. The tillage area in England and Wales dwindled by 3¾ million acres. In the United Kingdom (1909-13) 36 million acres were devoted to stock, and 3 million acres to such human food as wheat and potatoes Represented in cash, the net annual value to farmers of their two tillage crops was £27,000,000, and of their stock and stock products, £125,000,000. Aided by imports of concentrated feeding-stuffs, the farmers of these islands supplied our milk and three-fifths of our meat; they also provided one-fifth of our bread. For four-fifths of its daily consumption of bread, and for two-fifths of that of meat, the United Kingdom depended on foreign producers.
The inevitable consequence of the changed system of husbandry from tillage to grass was a reduction in the number of persons maintained from the land. In 1870 a much larger population was fed from our home resources than in 1909-13. After seventy years of agricultural progress, the land filled fewer mouths, though the demand for food had nearly trebled. The reason lies in decreased tillage, not in decreased skill. In actual food value for subsistence diet, the produce of the three million acres devoted to wheat and potatoes is only fractionally inferior to that of the 36 million acres appropriated to live-stock. From 100 acres of arable, 150 persons can be maintained for a year, while from 100 acres of grass, the number is under 15. The contrast with the quantity of food per acre raised by German farmers depends on the different demands made from agriculture by Germany and by England. One country definitely aims at making itself self-supporting; the other, for commercial reasons, prefers to buy the bulk of its food abroad. English farmers were not, and to many it seemed the height of improbability that they ever would be, asked to feed the English people.
In 1914 came the War. It was thought unnecessary to change the existing system of feeding the nation. Our own, Allied, or neutral shipping brought to our ports our foreign purchases of bread, meat and feeding-stuffs. At home, farmers continued to produce our milk and their normal proportion of wheat and of fresh beef and mutton. It is true that trade was now and then disturbed by enemy cruisers, mines and submarines. In the first five months of the war, the British Empire lost 100 ships of 252,738 gross tons. Only three of these were destroyed by submarines. Even these losses were more than balanced by our gain in prizes and in new ships. The attacks were annoying; they did not seriously aggravate difficulties. But before the war had lasted twelve months, the destruction of shipping began to arouse attention. Submarines, no longer obliged to hug their base, or to rest at frequent intervals in shallow water, were rapidly improved as weapons of attack. The figures of destruction rose from 29,376 gross tons in April, 1915, to 92,924 and 90,605 gross tons in the months of May and June respectively. For the moment the Government took alarm. A Departmental Committee was appointed (June 17) with Lord Milner as Chairman, to consider and report what steps should be taken to maintain and, if possible, increase "the present production of food in England and Wales, on the assumption that the war may be prolonged beyond the harvest of 1916." Their Interim Report (July 17, 1915) is important, because upon it was based the action of the Government eighteen months later.
The Committee assumed that, in the opinion of the Government, an emergency which called for exceptional measures was likely to exist after the harvest of 1916. On that assumption they unanimously recommended (1) that, in order to encourage wheat-growing, farmers should be guaranteed for four years a minimum price per quarter of wheat, payments to be regulated by the difference between the guarantee and the Gazette average price for wheat for the year in which the grain was harvested; (2) that District Committees should be set up by the County Councils, to each of which the Board of Agriculture should furnish, as a standard of endeavour, statements showing (a) the area under the plough, and (b) the acreage under wheat, oats and potatoes, in 1875 and 1914 respectively; (3) that each District Committee should consider and report on the capacity of every farm in its district. and on the willingness of individual farmers to contribute additional food. On the receipt of these Reports, the Committee proposed to consider whether compulsion would, or would not, be necessary.
At the time, the Government decided to take no action. A portion of the Report was, however, adopted by the President of the Board of Agriculture. County Councils were asked to appoint District Committees. In many counties they were set up; in some they were active. Meanwhile, shipping losses continued to increase. In 1915, the loss of the British Empire was 885,471 gross tons, and the total loss of the world was 1,312,216 gross tons. In 1916, the figures for the British Empire were 1,231,867 gross tons, and for the world 2,305,569 gross tons. A serious feature in the rate of loss was the rapid increase in the last three months of 1916. In October, November, December, the British Empire lost 524,574 gross tons, and the world 788,706 gross tons. The cumulative effect of these losses on the carrying capacity of shipping had become serious, especially as so large a tonnage was necessarily diverted from the transport of civilian cargoes to the conveyance of troops and war material. From the beginning of 1917 to the conclusion of hostilities, the shipping problem was of crucial importance. As soon as America joined the Allies, the cause was safe as regards money, men, munitions, and, if time allowed, ship-building. The danger-point shifted with dramatic suddenness to transport and food. On February 1, 1917, Germany had opened her intensive submarine campaign. She aimed at so large a destruction of the world's shipping as would make it impossible for the Allies to carry on the war. She met the blockade with a counter-blockade. The rate of destruction shot upwards with startling rapidity. In April alone the British Empire lost 526,447 gross tons, and the world 866,616 gross tons. It was the highest point reached in any one month. But the aggregate destruction of shipping for the year amounted to 3,660,054 gross tons and 6,078,125 gross tons for the British Empire and the world respectively. In the eleven months of 1918, owing mainly to the convoy system, the rate of destruction dropped. But it totalled for the British Empire 1,632,228 gross tons and for the world 2,528,082 gross tons. The figures tell their own tale. Against the losses must be set the gains of new ships. But it was not till July, 1918, that the corner of safety was turned, and that the monthly gain in new tonnage balanced the monthly loss in tonnage destroyed. Meanwhile, as day by day the scale of warlike operations expanded demands on transport multiplied. There was not enough tonnage left to meet essential needs. Every 5000 tons of civilian cargo carried meant the loss of 1000 American troops on the battlefield. Germany's intensive submarine campaign had seemed to some a desperate gamble. It came within measurable distance of success.
In December, 1916, a new Coalition Government came into office. It had become imperatively necessary to take careful stock of the food position of the Allies. Two and a half years of war, the drain on man-power, and the loss of territory were telling severely on the productive capacity of France and Italy. Here, as well as on the Continent, the harvest of 1916 had been bad. The area of winter-sown wheat in this country had shrunk by 60,000 acres. Exigencies of transport made America, with its short sea voyage, the main, if not the only, available source of supply. But her area of winter-sown wheat for the harvest of 1917 had declined, and it was doubtful whether she could, in the coming cereal year, meet the greatly increased demands of the Allies. We were, moreover, faced with the certainty of an acute shortage of potatoes. To these anxieties were added the difficulties of transport. As a necessity of life, bread-stuff must either be produced at home or imported from abroad. Even if sufficient wheat were on the foreign market, it could not be carried without curtailing the transport of men and munitions, essential for the successful prosecution of the war. In these circumstances, the Government determined to attempt an increase in the supply of home-grown corn and potatoes. If no addition could be made, the threatened decline might at least be arrested. Farmers were to be called on to feed the greatest possible number of the people. The decision reversed the tendencies of the last forty years. As far as was practicable, it aimed at recovering the tillage area of the 'Seventies, and reviving its system of husbandry.
The outlook in December, 1916, was not hopeful. Farmers could have doubled their output of food, if, like Munition Factories, they had commanded unlimited labour, abundant supplies of raw materials of industry, unrestricted prices for their produce, every form of priority, and protection for their men. But the nation was too much exhausted in man-power, tonnage, and finance to allow of any approach to this position. Agriculture was two years too late. Labourers, who had become efficient soldiers, could not be permanently released from the front. Even the skilled workers retained on the farms remained there subject to the paramount requirements of military service. Munitions necessarily had priority of transport over fertilisers, feeding-stuffs, or implements and agricultural machinery. The degree to which the land was depleted of labour differed from county to county and from farm to farm. But almost everywhere the shortage of skilled men was acute. Considerably more than a third had already left the land for service in the navy, army or munition factories. Ploughmen were scarce. Nearly half the steam-tackle sets were out of action, either from want of repair or from the loss of drivers. Many horses had been commandeered; others were unshod. Harness and implements were out of order. Wide districts were denuded of such essential handicraftsmen as blacksmiths, wheelwrights, saddlers, and harness-makers. Manufacturers of agricultural machinery and implements were making munitions. Fertilisers were scarce. Potash had disappeared from the market with the declaration of war. The restricted import of phosphatec rock and iron pyrites limited the supply of super-phosphates. Exports of home-produced fertilisers were stopped; but grinding machines to grind the basic slag and men to man them were both short, and munitions made heavy demands on the supply of sulphate of ammonia. Lime kilns were closed, because the lime-burners were at the front. Discouraged by their loss of men, farmers were still further disheartened by the uncertainty of retaining those that were left. The poor corn-harvest and the failure of the potato crop were accompanied by an adverse autumn season. The winter was severe, and, as it proved, prolonged. With labour short and fertilisers scarce, with the normal channels of the supply of agricultural requisites interrupted or blocked, a decrease in food production appeared inevitable. The shrinkage in the area of winter-sown wheat seemed ominous of a general decline in arable cultivation.
The position of food supplies and transport had become so critical that it was necessary to make light of difficulties. In many respects the situation of 1801-15 was reproduced; with contrasts as well as parallels, history repeated itself. To our ancestors, struggling in the throes of the Napoleonic War, the provision of bread became a paramount consideration. Fourteen million people in 1801, and in 1815 eighteen millions depended on the weather and the efforts of agriculturists at home. In spite of an exceptional series of bad harvests, the prodigious exertions of farmers averted actual famine, and even, in the one favourable season (1813), produced a surplus which was carried over to the two following years. To a partial extent, the position seemed likely to be repeated in 1917 and 1918. At both periods the way of safety lay in increased production on a larger arable acreage. In one material respect our ancestors were better off than ourselves. Their supply of skilled agricultural labour was never so depleted. At both periods it was imperative that we should not only grow more food, but economise in its use. Our ancestors adopted closer milling, mixed other ingredients than wheaten flour in their loaf, prohibited the sale of bread till it was twenty-four hours old. They suspended distilleries and starch manufactories. They abandoned the use of flour for hair powder. They made imitation pie-crust out of clay. Royal proclamations exhorted people to economy. By way of example Members of Parliament bound themselves to reduce their consumption by one third. Similar measures to effect economy were taken in the war with Germany. But the position had been rendered more difficult by the higher standard of living. In 1917 the country might well have revolted against hardships to which our ancestors were inured. With only a partial revelation of the facts, public opinion had to be instructed and created. In the Napoleonic War it was ready-made. Fed from home-grown food, the whole population knew from experience the need of "eating within a tether" which varied with the weather from sufficiency to scarcity. In the German War a generation had grown up which had no experience of the importance of production from their own soil or of the influence of seasons on food supplies. They could not conceive the possibility of their exclusion from foreign markets where harvests were more favourable. But the most striking difference between the two periods lies in the care which, during the recent war, was taken of the consumer. The contrast illustrates the profound change of social and political conditions and thought in the twentieth century. Our ancestors attempted no rationing or regulation of prices. They relied on the high cost of food to enforce economy and stimulate production. There was no restriction of producers' profits in the interests of consumers. Prices were allowed to find their natural level. The incentive of large gains spurred agriculturists to gigantic efforts. But, in the last two years of the German War, the appeal was as much to the farmer's patriotism as to his pocket. In the interests of consumers, flat maximum prices for agricultural produce were fixed; the 4-lb. loaf was stabilised at 9d., partly at the expense of the farmer whose home-grown wheat was artificially cheapened; the best and the worst qualities of home-grown beef and mutton were sold at the same price, so that the long and the short purses were in this respect placed on an equality. The general principle which guided the regulation of prices affords one of the most satisfactory contrasts in the story of agriculture during the French and the German Wars. But it did not make the problem of increasing production more easy of solution. One of the sharpest spurs to exertion was blunted.
The campaign for increased food production opened on December 20, 1916. Its course provoked acute controversies which are still discussed by agriculturists. Historically, its interest lies in the experiment of State control, and in the organisation created to carry out a definite policy. But its results were so largely influenced by patriotic feeling and special circumstances that it throws little light on the question whether, in ordinary times, compulsory methods would prove successful. From the first, the Board of Agriculture recognised that the willing co-operation of farmers was essential. On the other hand, it knew that, in the urgency of the national need, it might be obliged to force its plans on a reluctant minority. Thus the three main features of the movement were the improvement and extension of arable cultivation, both with the plough and the spade; decentralisation; and drastic powers of compulsion, justified by the emergency of war. In its general principles, the policy of the plough was imposed on the agricultural industry by national necessities. Broadly speaking, the country wanted the largest possible quantity of food in the shortest possible time. As between grass and tillage, the only question worth considering was, by which system of husbandry the greatest number of people could be provided with subsistence diet. To this there was but one answer. Arable farming feeds at least four times as many persons as can be fed from grass of average quality. In its main details, the policy was similarly dictated by necessity. The interruption of sea-borne trade and the strain on the carrying capacity of shipping threatened our food supplies from three special directions. Our imports of corn, of concentrated feeding-stuffs, and of artificial fertilisers were imperilled. The three danger-spots were, therefore, bread, winter meat and winter milk, and the maintenance or restoration of exhausted fertility. Increased output might be obtained from grading up the cultivation of the existing arable acreage. But no adequate results could be expected from this source only, especially as a considerable area already needed a rest from cropping. In the shortage of fertilisers it was necessary to release with the plough the stored-up fertility of the grass. Our summer milk and meat off pasture was not in danger; but, if imported food for live-stock was cut off, the winter supplies were in jeopardy, unless additional fodder-stuffs could be grown on arable land at home.
The general policy could only be carried out by decentralisation. It involved securing the adequate cultivation and cropping of millions of acres of arable land and extending the tillage area by ploughing up grass in sixty-one Counties and County Divisions. Several hundreds of thousands of separate businesses could not be treated, like factories, as controlled establishments. Even if it had been possible, it would have been foolish. Local farmers were the best judges, in their own districts, of insufficient cultivation and of the most suitable land for the plough. An organisation already existed which might be adapted for the purpose. In most counties War Agricultural Committees had been set up on the recommendation of the Milner Committee. They were too large for executive action. But they were asked to appoint not more than seven members, who, with such additions to the number as the Board might make, constituted the new County Agricultural Executive Committees. These smaller bodies, established in each County or County Division (61 in number), became the local agents of the Board of Agriculture. To them were delegated many powers which the Board exercised under the Defence of the Realm Act or retained under the Corn Production Act of 1917. They were assisted by District Committees, and, in some cases, by Parish Representatives. Each of the sixty-one Executives was provided with the necessary funds for staff and office expenses. As their work developed, they formed Sub-Committees for such branches as Survey, Cultivation, Supplies, Labour, Machinery, Horticulture, and Finance. During 1918, they were also entrusted with the responsibility of selecting recruits for the Army. The members of the Executive Committees, the majority of whom were farmers actively engaged in business, gave their time, knowledge and experience without pay or reward. Their difficult and invidious duty was performed with a discretion which reduced friction to a minimum. The Counties were further grouped in twenty-one Districts, to each of which a District Commissioner was appointed by the Board. An ex officio member of each of the County Executive Committees in his district, he served as a link between the Committees and headquarters. Acting under the District Commissioners were 36 Sub-Commissioners, whose special duties were to superintend the work of District Committees. By means of this network of local organisation, each parish was, as it were, connected with the central authority.
The first Cultivation of Lands Order, which vested in the County Executive Committees many of the powers of the Board, was sealed on January 19, 1917. The document was circulated to the Committees, with explanatory instructions for their guidance. It was too late in the farming year to attempt large additions to the tillage area for the harvest of 1917. The primary object set before the Committees was to assist farmers in the cultivation and cropping of their arable land, so as to secure the largest possible output of essential food. They were also asked to make a rapid survey of their districts in order to report what ploughing and sowing might be done in the coming spring. For the harvest of 1918, they were requested to make a more detailed survey, and were furnished on June 18, 1917, with quota of the arable acreage and crops which the Government aimed at securing in each county. The powers vested in the Committees were drastic. Where grass-land could be more profitably used in the national interest as arable, they were empowered to require it to be broken up, or to enter and plough it up themselves. Notices were to be served on occupiers specifying the grass fields to be ploughed, or the acts of cultivation to be executed, which the Committees considered necessary for the increase of food production. Failure to comply with notices rendered occupiers liable to fine or imprisonment. No appeal was allowed. Committees were further empowered to take possession of the whole or part of a badly cultivated farm, and either cultivate it themselves or arrange for its cultivation by others. The Board retained in its own hands power to determine, or to authorise the owner to determine, forthwith the tenancy of badly farmed land. By the end of January, 1917, most of the Executive Committees were established. Many had already made good progress with the preliminary survey and had begun to stimulate adequate cultivation.
The Board of Agriculture itself was not equipped to lead the movement. It had not the necessary organisation. To meet the new needs, a new branch was constituted. The Food Production Department was formed by the President, January 1, 1917, and charged with the novel functions of collecting and distributing labour, machinery, implements, fertilisers, feeding-stuffs, and other requisites of the industry and of assisting Committees to enforce their orders. It was designed to serve as a clearing-house for the requirements of individual farmers, notified through their Executive Committees. It became the pivot of the campaign. Its services were invaluable and multifarious. As the last comer in the field of national effort, agriculture found its legitimate territory already occupied by other departments, whose duties might sometimes clash with those of the farming industry. Soldier or prisoner labour was controlled by the War Office; that of interned aliens by the Home Office; that of civilian volunteers and public school-boys by the Ministry of National Service. Feeding-stuffs were controlled by the Minister of Food, fertilisers by the Minister of Munitions. To the latter Ministry also belonged the sanction for the manufacture or import of agricultural implements and machinery. These conditions restricted individual enterprise. But by notifying their wants through their Executive Committees to the Food Production Department, farmers were, as far as possible, supplied with their requirements. Some idea of the scale on which the Department worked in 1918 may be gathered from the following figures of the activities of four of the principal branches. Through the Labour Division were supplied 72,247 soldiers, 30,405 prisoners of war, 3904 War Agricultural Volunteers, 15,000 public school-boys, making, with "other labour" (430), a total of 121,986 men. Through the Women's Division were provided some 300,000 part-time workers, and a Land Army, working full time, of the maximum strength of 16,000 women. The Cultivation Branch placed at the disposal of the Committees 4200 tractors; it obtained the manufacture or import of 66 steam tackle sets, 4720 reapers and binders, 438 threshing machines; it provided many thousands of ploughs, carts and lorries, cultivators harrows, disc harrows, land presses and rollers; it operated 10,000 horses; it trained ploughmen and tractor-drivers. The Supplies Branch obtained in the fertiliser year 1917-18, 232,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia, 750,000 tons of superphosphates, and 200,000 tons of basic slag; it distributed 8700 quarters of selected seed wheat, 29,700 quarters of Irish, Scotch and Manx seed oats, and 32,800 tons of seed potatoes; it provided 20,000 tons of binder twine. With so powerful an organisation at its back, each Executive Committee knew that it had the means in case of default by occupiers, of carrying out its orders to cultivate or plough.
Thus assisted, the farming industry was able to endure the loss of more than a third of its skilled labour, and to withstand the further shock of the calling up of many of their most experienced men--30,000 in January 1917 and upwards of 22,000 in June 1918. During the whole of 1917 and the first half of 1918, Executive Committees enforced cultivation under the extensive powers which the Board derived from two Regulations of the Defence of the Realm Act (2L and 2M). After August, 1918, the Regulations were superseded by the Corn Production Act, which had been passed in the previous year. That Act gave the Board of Agriculture powers for a period of six years to enforce the plough policy and improve the cultivation of land. In return for the acceptance of control and of the increased risks of arable farming, it guaranteed the growers of wheat and oats for the harvests of 1917-22 against substantial loss through a fall in prices. It prohibited the raising of rents during the period unless, without the operation of the guarantee, the holding could stand the rise. It provided machinery for fixing minimum rates of wages for agricultural labourers during the continuance of the Act. In the view of the Government, apart from other considerations, this latter provision was necessitated by the prosecution of the plough policy. The creation of a large subsidised force of supplementary labour,--consisting of soldiers, women, public school-boys, National Service volunteers, old-age pensioners, interned aliens, and prisoners, though farmers paid for their services the current rates of wages, flooded the labour market, upset the laws of supply and demand, and prevented agricultural workers from profiting by the scarcity of skilled labour.
For the harvest of 1917, the food campaign attempted no great increase of tillage. But approximately one million acres were added to the arable area of the United Kingdom. The production of white corn in 1917 was greater than that of 1914, 1915, and 1916 by 4,710,000 quarters, 3,837,000 quarters, and 5,827,000 quarters respectively. In weight the increase in wheat, barley and oats, and in potatoes on agricultural land, was, as compared with 1916, four million tons. At the same time, the weight of roots and hay produced in 1917 exceeded that of any of the three preceding war years. With more than a third of their skilled labour gone, the farmers of England and Wales brought under the plough an additional area of 290,000 acres (187,000 permanent grass) and sowed an increased breadth of 338,000 acres with corn or potatoes. By direction of the Board, the area under hops was reduced by half, that under mustard for seed by two-thirds, and that under bulbs or flowers considerably cut down. The land thus set free was cultivated for food crops. To the harvest of the plough must be added that of the spade. An integral part of the food production campaign was the increase in allotments. In the years 1917 and 1918 the number was raised from 530,000 to 1,400,000. As the strain on man-power and transport grew more intense, the value of the movement became more marked. The holdings were cultivated in the spare time of workers following their daily avocations, and the wide local distribution of the food produced relieved the carrying capacity of railways. Taking into account not only the increased number of allotments, but the displacement of flowers by vegetables on private and nursery gardens, the additional weight of food grown cannot be put at less than one million tons.
The increase of food was of the utmost value. Had production fallen below that of 1916--as at one time appeared probable--the consequences to the Allied cause would have been serious. Harvests in France and Italy were short; in many districts the scarcity approached to famine. In America, if the domestic consumption had maintained the normal rate, supplies could not have met the demands of the Allies. The addition to her output made by Great Britain enabled food to be diverted from these islands to France and Italy at a critical moment. But, in the early months of 1918, wrote the Chairman of the Allied Maritime Executive, "the spectre of famine was more terrifying than at any previous period." Fresh efforts were urgently necessary. For the harvest of 1918, the Government aimed at increasing the tillage area of England and Wales cultivated for other crops than grass by 2,600,000 acres on the figures of 1916. Many delays and disappointments hindered the execution of the complete programme. Military exigencies prevented the promised supplies of labour and tractors. Owing to the protracted harvest of 1917, farm work had fallen into arrear. But the winter and spring proved more favourable. The farmers of England and Wales seized their opportunity gallantly. In some Counties the quota of tillage and cropping were obtained, if not exceeded. Everywhere, the area under cultivation for other crops than grass was so far increased that an aggregate of upwards of 1,950,000 additional acres was reached. In July, 1918, the prospects of the Corn crops were magnificent. A harvest was in sight, which was compared in its promised abundance to that of 1868. In the South the crops were gathered in splendid condition; in the North the weather broke when they were still in the fields. The incessant rain of September and October did considerable damage, and made the winning of the harvest a fine achievement on the part of farmers. Even when the loss is discounted, the addition to the food supplies of the nation was great. The following Table gives the results of the harvest of 1918 in England and Wales, as compared with 1916, and the average of the last ten years of peace.
To the corn figures must be added the grain produced on over 50,000 acres of rye, which was additional to the usual quantity cut as a green crop.
Against the increase in bread-stuffs and potatoes must be set the loss of fodder-stuffs for stock. The hay harvest was disappointing, the area under roots was diminished; and 1,400,000 acres of pasture were ploughed. On the other hand, there was an increase of 809,000 tons of oat-straw and considerable quantities of damaged wheat and barley, not included in the following Table, were available for stock. Converting the lost fodders into their beef equivalent it is estimated 1 that from 90,000 to 110,000 tons of meat were sacrificed. Even with this deduction, the net gain in human food was large.
INCREASE PERCENTAGE
OF INCREASE
CROPS 1918 1916 1904-13.
Over Over Over Over
1916 1904-13 1916 1904-18
(In Thousands of Quarters) % %
Wheat 10,534 6,835 6,653 3,699 3,881 54 58
Barley 6,085 5,181 6,212 904 -127 17 -2
Oats 14,336 10,411 10,572 3,925 3,764 38 36
Mixed Corn 620 620 620
Beans and
Peas 1,328 1,122 1,529 206 -201 18 -13
TOTAL 32,903 23,549 24,966 9,354 7,937 49 32
(In Thousands of Tons)
Potatoes 4,209 2,505 2,643 1,704 1,566 68 59
A new programme, which aimed at a further increase of one million acres in the arable area of England and Wales for the harvest of 1919, was drawn up in the early spring of 1918. It was never submitted to the Cabinet for decision. The German offensives in March and April changed the situation. A military demand was made on agriculture for thirty thousand of its most efficient workers. In July, the Board of Agriculture decided, on a careful survey of the whole position, not to enforce further additions to the arable acreage, but to rely for the maintenance or increase of production on grading-up the cultivation of existing tillages. The withdrawal of the 1919 programme terminated the policy, which as a matter of war emergency had added 2,966,000 acres to the area cultivated in the United Kingdom for other crops than grass.
So long as the campaign lasted, agriculture, under a decentralised form, was treated as a controlled factory for the production of the food which the nation needed. Behind the orders of the Executive Committees stood the Government and effective means of enforcing notices to plough, cultivate or sow. But the efficacy of State control was tried under such special conditions as render the experiment comparatively valueless. In other respects the war left a more permanent mark on the industry. It added to the difficulties of landowners. Except for the favourable opportunity of sale which it afforded, they were the class which was most crippled. It largely increased the number of occupying owners. It stimulated improvement in the general standard of cultivation. It aided farmers and agricultural workers to build up strong organisations. It gave to both classes a measure of temporary prosperity. It forced the nation to realise the importance of the industry and to exercise its right to prescribe the use to which the land should be put. But it did not solve the problems of peace. On the contrary, it made them more acute.